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Abstract 
We study how markets adjust to the entry of new firms under different conditions. Two incumbents face 
entry by three other firms. When firms’ costs are equal, entry always leads consumer surplus and profits 
to their equilibrium levels. When entrants are more efficient than incumbents, entry leads consumer 
surplus to equilibrium. With cost asymmetries, market behavior is satisfactory from the consumers’ 
standpoint but does not yield adequate signals to other potential entrants. Simultaneous entry is in the 
short run more favorable to consumers than sequential entry. A longer incumbency phase favors 
consumers after entry. 
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1. Introduction 
 For markets to function well they need to react properly to new entrants. 
Newcomers have to be able to capture a part of the market, and more efficient entrants 
have to succeed in displacing, partially or completely, older less efficient firms. This 
process of readjustment and renewal is at the core of the creative destruction that is 
crucial to the progress of modern societies. Following Schumpeter, economists have 
devoted considerable attention to analyzing this process, as in the work of Jovanovic 
(1982), Hopenhayn (1992), Ericson and Pakes (1995), Roberts and Tybout (1997) and 
Caves (1998). 
In this paper, we present results from experiments designed to shed light on 
some particular aspects of the process of entry and exit. More specifically, we study 
how markets in which incumbent firms face entry by other firms adjust to the new 
competition. We are interested in seeing whether there is a pure incumbency or first-
mover effect, in the sense that the very fact that some firms have been present in a 
market earlier than others gives them an advantage over the latecomers. In the cases we 
will be studying, incumbents will not have the possibility of preventing entry by pre-
commiting to appropriate output levels, as in the literature that starts with Bain (1956) 
and Sylos-Labini (1962). There will be no entry cost. What we ask is whether 
incumbency itself creates an asymmetry that favors established firms and allows them 
to hold on to their position in the market.  
Our central interest is in the study of efficiency in our markets. We ask both 
whether the market prices that emerge are satisfactory from the consumers’ standpoint 
and whether more efficient entrants are able to displace the less efficient established 
firms, so that the market gives the appropriate signals to other potential entrants. In the 
environments we study there is an avoidable fixed cost so that, depending on the overall 
cost distributions, the market may not be able to accommodate all the firms that would 
like to be present in it. In our experiments we are able to study this accomodation 
process in detail. Specifically, we study how the length of time in which incumbents are 
protected from competition, the cost advantages of entrants, and the time-structure of 
the entry-process affect firm behavior and market efficiency. The impact of these three 
factors yields a broad picture of the entry process. 
Issues related to the ones we study here have been analyzed before. The strategy 
and marketing literature has paid considerable attention to the analysis of first-mover 
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advantages. The seminal article is Lieberman and Montgomery (1988). More recently 
the articles by Kerin et al. (1992), Robinson et al. (1994), Zahra et al. (1995), Mueller 
(1997) and Lieberman and Montgomery (1998) have surveyed and classified the 
contributions to this literature. These studies use field data to analyze the extent to 
which first-mover advantage exists in different industries and proposes that firms that 
enter the market early may be able to obtain advantages of various types such as prime 
physical locations or favourable customer perception. 
The theoretical industrial organization literature has carefully studied the 
strategic aspects of incumbency advantages. The issue of entry deterrence by 
established firms has received considerable attention as one of the leading instances of 
the importance of commitment in sequential games. References to and discussions of 
these issues appear in virtually all the teaching manuals in the area (see e.g. Tirole 1989, 
Basu 1993, Martin 1993 and Vives 1999). 
In this paper we approach things from a different perspective. We ask whether 
markets exhibit inertia of a non-strategic type. The existence of inertia is often 
considered in economic analysis, as when hysteresis is taken into account in macro-
economics. Adjustment to new market circumstances often just takes time, and during 
this transition those firms that were in the market first may enjoy a better situation than 
in the long run. This kind of inertia can then be a relevant factor intervening in the entry 
process of new firms into a market and have considerable efficiency consequences. 
Some previous experimental studies have found evidence of a purely non-
strategic advantage of incumbents. Brandts et al. (2007) find evidence of first-mover 
advantage in an experimental study of how incumbents can use investment in capacity 
to deter entry, in which the strategic prediction is that of second-mover advantage. 
There are also several studies on the topic of order of play in experimental games. 
Rapaport et al. (1990), Rapaport et al. (1993), and Rapaport (1997) find evidence that in 
bargaining games and sequential common resource dilemmas, earlier movers take larger 
portions than do late movers. Weber et al. (2004) and Muller and Sadanand (2003) find 
that when simple two-person games that are simultaneous in terms of information are 
played sequentially, the first mover tends to do better than when both players make 
actual simultaneous choices. In the present paper we ask whether this kind of 
phenomenon also emerges in a market selection environment.  
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The study by Huck et al. (2007) on the merger paradox contains a thorough 
experimental analysis of the effects the merging of firms has on market shares and 
competition under quantity competition; of special interest is how the authors relate 
their work to field-data studies on mergers. The paper also contains an experimental 
treatment on entry which is related to our work. In our concluding section we will come 
back to this study and discuss the connections between their work and ours. 
Experiments have been used to study a large number of policy-relevant market 
and industrial organization issues. The focus of these studies is on the interaction of 
firms in a variety of environments. Isaac and Smith (1985) and Jung et al. (1994) study 
the workings of predatory pricing, and Huck et al. (2000) study effects on firm behavior 
of providing firm-specific price and profit data. A number of studies such as Rassenti et 
al. (2001, 2002, and 2003), Abbink et al. (2003), and Brandts et al. (2008) analyze 
aspects of market power in electricity markets. Plott (1997) and Plott and Salmon 
(2004) discuss the use of experiments in relation to the spectrum auctions in the US. 
Holt (1995) surveys some of the earlier literature on industrial organization 
experiments, and Normann (2006) present a more specific recent overview and 
discussion of the use of experiments for antitrust policy. As in other areas the advantage 
of experimental studies of firm interaction are replicability and control. With respect to 
our experiments, we think that it will be clear below that it would have been difficult to 
carry out our analysis on the basis of field data alone, since in natural environments it 
would be unusual to find appropriate data with the desired variations in the cost 
structures, the nature of the entry process, and the length of the incumbency period. 
We base our analysis on the case of quantity competition. This way of modeling 
the interaction between firms has been used in numerous empirical studies involving 
field data. For example, Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) refer to quantity competition in 
their empirical study of entry and competition in concentrated markets, and Borenstein 
and Bushnell (1999) study markets in the California electricity market after deregulation 
and represent it as a Cournot market with a competitive fringe. The frequent use of the 
Cournot model in applied work suggests that this is a sensible way of representing in a 
simplified manner the workings of certain markets. 
One important characteristic of experimental studies of market interaction is that 
equilibrium behavior is not imposed. Participants in the experiment know the market 
rules and in our case act under complete information, but there is no reason to expect 
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(nor to impose) that they will from the start jump to the corresponding market 
equilibrium. Rather, they will make some reasonable initial decision and then react to 
the actions of others and to what they learn about the market environment they are in. 
This process may then lead to equilibrium or not. We believe that the lack of imposition 
of equilibrium behavior is an advantage of the experimental approach since it 
corresponds better to how firms have to find their way in the market. As will be seen 
below, actual behavior will overall be influenced by the most relevant equilibrium. 
However, the process of adjustment takes time and has some important qualitative 
features. 
Our results show that when incumbents and entrants have identical costs, 
sufficient entry drives consumer surplus and profits to their equilibrium levels. In 
contrast, when entrants are more efficient than incumbents, entry leads consumer 
surplus to equilibrium, but total profits remain substantially below equilibrium since 
incumbents are able to keep market shares significantly above what equilibrium 
prescribes. This is possible due to the willingness to accept negative profits for a good 
number of market rounds. Efficient entrants produce too little and earn too little. Market 
perfomance is satisfactory from the consumers’ standpoint (total production is high 
enough) but entrants’ low profits do not yield adequate signals to other potential 
entrants. These results are not affected by whether entry is simultaneous or sequential, 
whereas the length of the incumbency phase does have some secondary effects. 
 
2. Experimental design 
All our experimental sessions start with two identical incumbents competing in 
quantities for a fixed number of periods.1 After these periods additional firms are given 
access to the market. We report data from a total of six treatments, summarized in Table 
1. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 We could have started with a monopolist incumbent. However, the two incumbent case yields 
information concerning cooperation of settled firms. As shown by Huck et al. (2004) collusion is not 
easily sustained with three or more firms. 
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF TREATMENTS 
Treatment label Timing of entry Cost distribution Incumbency duration 
Seq-Sym10 Sequential 5  firms with identical 
marginal and fixed 
costs 
10 rounds 
Simul-Sym10 Simultaneous Same as Seq-Sym10 10 rounds 
Seq-Asym10 Sequential 2 identical incumbents 
with higher marginal 
costs than the three 
identical entrants and 
identical fixed costs  
10 rounds 
Simul-Asym10 Simultaneous Same as Seq-Asym10 10 rounds 
Seq-Asym20 Sequential Same as Seq-Asym10 20 rounds 
Simul-Asym20 Simultaneous Same as Seq-Asym10 20 rounds 
 
We study the effects of three treatment variables: the timing of entry, the 
distribution of firms’ costs, and the duration of incumbency. The variation in these 
variables is meant to get at some of the potentially crucial aspects of the process of 
firms entering the market and the market selecting market shares for the different firms.  
The difference between sequential and simultaneous entry is the following. Under 
sequential entry one of the entrants is given access to the market in the first period after 
incumbency is over, a second firm 10 periods later, and a third firm after another 10 
periods. Under simultaneous entry all entrants are given access to the market in the first 
period after incumbency is over. 
 The variation in the length of the incumbency period is motivated by our interest 
in inertia; a longer incumbency period can potentially lead to more inertia. Our 
distinction between symmetric and asymmetric cost structures is precisely directed at 
discovering (by comparison) in which way the presence of asymmetric firms affects 
behaviour. The distinction between sequential and simultaneous entry is meant to reflect 
the situations in different types of markets. For example, in some newly deregulated 
markets, entry takes place sequentially.2 
 
2.1. Theoretical Background and Research Questions 
 
What are the available theoretical benchmarks for the treatments? From previous 
experimental work by Huck et al. (2004), we know that behaviour in repeated quantity 
competition games can be expected to conform to the equilibria of the corresponding 
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one-shot game, even if the interaction takes place over 50 rounds or more. Therefore, 
Table 2 presents the relevant complete information Cournot equilibria for  the specific 
parameter configurations we used as our benchmarks. 
 
TABLE 2. COURNOT EQUILIBRIUM BENCHMARKS* 
Treatment Demand 
function 
Fixed and 
Variable Costs 
Equilibrium quantities Equilibrium 
total surplus 
Seq-Sym10 P=13-0.2Q FC = 15 
IMC = 1 
EMC = 1 
Rounds 1-10: IQ= 20 
Rounds 11-20: 
IQ=EQ=15 
Rounds 21-30: 
IQ=EQ=12 
Rounds 31-40: 
IQ=EQ=10 
Rounds 1-10: 
290  
Rounds 11-20: 
292.5 
Rounds 21-30: 
285.6 
Rounds 31-40: 
275 
Simul-Sym10 P=13-0.2Q FC = 15 
IMC = 1 
EMC = 1 
Rounds 1-10: IQ=20 
Rounds 11-40: 
IQ=EQ=10 
Rounds 1-10: 
290  
Rounds 11-40: 
275 
Seq-Asym10 P=11-0.1Q FC = 30 
IMC = 2 
EMC = 1 
Rounds 1-10: IQ=30 
Rounds 11-20: IQ=20, 
EQ=30 
Rounds 21-30: IQ=0 
EQ=33 
Rounds 31-40: IQ=0, 
EQ=25 
Rounds 1-10: 
300  
Rounds 11-20: 
325 
Rounds 21-30: 
383.1 
Rounds 31-40: 
378.75 
Simul-Asym10 P=11-0.1Q FC = 30 
IMC = 2 
EMC = 1 
Rounds 1-10: IQ=30 
Rounds 11-40: EQ=25 
Rounds 1-10: 
300 
Rounds 31-40: 
378.75 
Seq-Asym20 P=11-0.1Q FC = 30  
IMC = 2 
EMC = 1 
 Same as Seq-Asym10 Analogous to 
Seq-Asym10 
Simul-Asym20 P=11-0.1Q FC = 30 
IMC = 2 
EMC = 1 
Same as Simul-Asym10 Analogous to 
Simul-Asym10  
* P stands for the market price, Q for total quantity, FC for fixed cost, IMC for incumbent marginal cost, 
EMC for entrant marginal cost, IQ for incumbent quantity, and EQ for entrant quantity. The collusive quantity is 50 
when MC=1 and 30 when MC=2  
 
As can be seen from the table the demand function was always linear and the 
fixed cost was always the same for all firms in a treatment but with small variations 
across treatments because we wanted equilibrium quantity choices to be integers for 
implementation in the experiment. In the two variations of treatment 1, the five firms 
                                                                                                                                                                          
2
 The theoretical IO literature also distinguishes between simultaneous and sequential entry. See Vives. 
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were identical. In all the variations of treatment 2, all three identical entrants have a 
marginal cost that is half the one of incumbents.3  
The fourth column of Table 2 shows the equilibrium predictions corresponding 
to the Cournot equilibrium.4 For treatments Seq-Sym10 and Simul-Sym10 the 
equilibrium pattern is very straightforward: individual output is always positive and 
decreases with the number of firms in the market, while total output increases with this 
number. For the other four treatments the equilibrium patterns are more interesting. In 
rounds 11-20 of Seq-Asym10 (21-30 in treatment Seq-Asym20) the first of the entrants 
simply obtains a larger market share than each of the incumbents, but once the second 
entrant has access to the market, the two incumbents leave the market, due to the 
existence of the avoidable fixed cost. In the two treatments with asymmetric firms and 
simultaneous entry the three entrants expel the incumbents from the market right away. 
This kind of “dynamics” in which more efficient firms replace less efficient firms over 
time is what we are interested in exploring.5 In natural markets, there are certainly many 
instances where some established firms have to stop producing altogether due to the 
productive superiority of new entrants.6 
Our most general interest is in seeing how well these markets perform after entry 
takes place, both with respect to consumers and to producers. What are the research 
questions about firm behaviour for the first two treatments: Seq-Sym10 and Simul-
Sym10?7  Given that firms are identical, equilibrium production levels are of course 
identical. However, perhaps incumbents will, after entry, somehow be able to keep a 
larger part of the market. The simple fact of being in the market first may give them an 
advantage in the eyes of the entrants. What is important here is that if incumbents 
                                                          
3
 We feel that this is a natural way to start. Other patterns of heterogeneous costs will be studied in future 
work. 
4
 The production level that is shown always corresponds to that of the firms that have access to the market 
in the corresponding periods.   
5
 For the dynamics one important issue is the chosen time horizon. For the experiments we present in this 
paper we chose 40 and 50 periods. A substantially longer horizon may change behavior. Additionally, to 
get closer to an infinite horizon environment, it would be possible to implement a situation with random 
termination or even one in which termination would be certain but unknown to participants. 
6
 A possible drawback of a design in which some firms produce zero in the post-entry equilibrium is that 
errors and being bored with doing nothing could lead participants to produce a non-equilibrium quantity. 
However, we feel that as a first step, it is good to study the case that more directly represents some 
important situations in the field. 
7
 Observe that our experiments are not intended simply to look at comparative statics. Rather, our design 
focuses on history of dependence and change. 
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produce more than the equilibrium prescribes, then the entrants’ best responses imply 
that they yield some market share to the incumbents.  
The notion that we posit here is related to some intuitive ideas and to some 
evidence about the existence of a perceived first-mover advantage, mentioned in the 
introduction. The notion of aspiration levels is important here. Huck et al. (2007) show 
that their results about the merger paradox can be explained by aspiration levels , which 
in this context refer to firms’ commitment to maintaining their original profits. They 
extensively discuss field-data studies in which aspiration levels are part of the 
explanation of merger behavior. We refer the reader to that discussion, which highlights 
the connection between research with experimental and with field data. 
Another conjecture pertains to possibly different effects of sequential vs. 
simultaneous entry. From Huck et al. (2004) we know that repeated quantity 
competition with two firms leads to some collusion, while with three and four firms the 
Cournot stage-game equilibrium is a good predictor. However, this regularity was 
observed for the case where all firms are in the market from the start. For our cases, 
behaviour may be different. In particular for treatment Seq-Sim10 with sequential entry, 
one can conjecture that the expected initial collusion of the incumbents will rather easily 
carry over to subsequent rounds; the fact that the number of firms increases gradually 
may make it possible to maintain some degree of collusion with more than two firms.  
In contrast, for treatment Simul-Sym10 it seems a priori less likely that collusion 
will survive after round 11 since three firms will enter simultaneously and the market 
will then instantly have five firms, a number for which previous evidence suggests 
production levels close or even above the Cournot stage-game equilibrium. 
For the comparison between symmetric and asymmetric treatments, it is less 
straightforward to formulate plausible a priori conjectures. The fact that incumbents are 
less efficient than entrants may cause them to yield more easily; the cost difference may 
make the option of giving in to the entrants more salient. However, at the same time 
incumbents may feel more motivated to resist the equilibrium forces, since they lead to 
incumbents’ complete defeat. If entrants anticipated such a resistance, then they may 
behave more conservatively and hence leave some share of the market for the 
incumbents. Before the fact both these possibilities make some sense.  
With respect to the asymmetric treatments, another question is how the 
interaction between inefficient incumbents and efficient entrants will depend on whether 
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entry is sequential or simultaneous. Here our intuition is, as for the case of identical 
firms, that sequential entry will be more favorable to incumbents’ resistance to change. 
For the comparison between treatments Seq-Asym10 and Seq-Asym20 on one 
side and treatments Simul-Asym10 and Simul-Asym20 on the other side simple 
intuition suggests that longer incumbency duration may lead to better collusion after 
entry occurs. Inertia may be a force in our context.8 
We can now succinctly state our four research questions: 
 
1. Will consumer surplus and total profits after entry be at equilibrium levels 
and, if there are significant deviations, how do they depend on the treatment 
variables? 
 
2. Can incumbents ensure themselves a larger than equilibrium market share 
after entry has occurred and how does this depend on whether incumbents 
are efficient or inefficient? 
 
3. Do the answers to questions 1 and 2 depend on whether entry is sequential 
or simultaneous? 
 
4. Do the answers to questions 1 and 2 depend on the length of the incumbency 
phase? 
 
2.2. Procedures 
 
The experiment was programmed using z-tree (see Fischbacher 2007), and the 
sessions were run in the experimental laboratories of the UAB and the UPF. The 
experimental participants were UAB and UPF students from a variety of fields of study. 
Each person was allowed in only one session. The appendix (available on the JEBO 
website) contains a translation of the instructions for treatment 2.1a. In all our 
experiments subjects had the roles of the different firms, while the demand was 
simulated (see the instructions). Subjects had complete information about the parameter 
configuration of the group they were in. However, they had no information about 
equilibrium quantities. 
Subjects interacted in fixed groups of five over the 40 or 50 rounds to reflect the 
repeated game character of actual oligopoly markets. Two or three groups were 
                                                          
8
 For an experimental analysis of inertia in the context of how to turn around organizations that are 
suffering from coordination failure, see Brandts and Cooper (2006). 
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simultaneously in the lab. Subjects were not told which of the other session participants 
were in the same group.  
3. Results 
 We start by a general description of our data. Table 3 contains period-per-period 
actual and equilibrium quantities for all six treatments, aggregated over groups of each 
treatments. Table 4 shows analogous information for actual and equilibrium total 
surplus levels. We have data from nine independent groups (markets) for the six 
treatments shown in Table 1. In section 3.2 we present a more formal statistical analysis 
of our results. 
3.1 Overview 
We start with treatment Seq-Sym10. The average total quantity data shown in 
Table 3 indicate that tacit collusion is substantial with two firms, persists with three and 
four firms, and only diminishes with five firms.9 Figure 1 shows firms’ average 
production levels dependent on when they are given access to the market. After entry 
incumbents’ average production levels are not larger than those of the relevant entrants; 
indeed, after round 21 incumbents’ production levels are mostly below those of the 
other firms. 
The data shown in Tables 3 and 4 for the Simul-Sym10 treatment outcomes are 
qualitatively similar to those of the Seq-Sym 10 treatment. Considerable tacit collusion 
appears in the incumbency phase and a weak degree of it after entry. Consistent with 
this, entry leads to total surplus levels close but below equilibrium ones. Now entry 
does lead to production levels close to the Cournot equilibrium. Figure 2 reveals that 
entry and incumbents produce similar amounts. Together, figures 1 and 2 document that 
in our two symmetric treatments, incumbents do not resist entry. 
 Behaviour for the Seq-Asym10 treatment is shown in Figures 3, 4, and 5 and in 
the corresponding columns of Tables 3 and 4. Total production over time indicates, as 
before, collusion in the first ten rounds and in rounds 21 to 30; observe that for rounds 
1-20 all total average production levels are above the corresponding equilibrium levels. 
In subsequent periods, output levels reach and often “overshoot” the equilibrium levels, 
                                                          
9
 Average total production in the first 10 rounds is 30,25, and in none of the rounds is it above the 
equilibrium of 40. 
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something that was rare for the case of identical firms. Figure 3 shows the average 
behavior of the different firms that enter at different points in time, and figure 4 shows 
average behavior of the inefficient incumbents and average behaviour (irrespective of 
entry time) of the more efficient entrants, together with the Cournot equilibrium levels. 
Incumbents’ total quantity does decrease over time, but much more slowly than what 
the equilibrium levels prescribe. Consistent with this, entrants produce considerably less 
than in equilibrium. Figure 5 shows average profits of the two types of firms. Here one 
can see that incumbents’ profits become negative in the last part of the experiment, and 
one may conjecture that, with a longer time-horizon, this would lead to the complete 
exit of incumbents.  
The comparison of total surplus with equilibrium total surplus in Table 4 reveals 
that the markets of treatment Seq-Asym10 are under-performing over the complete 
time-horizon. The under-performance of the first ten periods is similar to what we saw 
for the case of identical firms. However, what happens in periods 11 to 40 is different 
from the identical firm case for two reasons. First, for periods 21 to 40 the difference 
between behavior and equilibrium is larger than in treatment Seq-Sym10. Second, we 
know from Table 3 that the total quantity produced is not inefficient. The problem is, as 
indicated by the graphs in figure 4, that the output level is produced in an inefficient 
way. The market has difficulty in selecting the right firms to produce the right levels of 
quantities, at least in the time-horizon that we consider. In comparison with the identical 
firms case, behavior in this treatment is more favorable to the consumer but not so in 
terms of the use of production resources. Market signals to possible additional entrants 
are not the right ones. 
 For treatment Simul-Asym10 the data in Table 3 reveal that for the total quantity 
there are no clear differences with respect to the behavior of the previous treatment. 10 
Figures 6 to 7 show output decisions in the treatment at a more disaggregated level. 
Figure 6 shows average production levels of the two types of firms, as well as the 
corresponding equilibrium levels. Apart from the post-entry drop, we do not observe 
any clear time trend of incumbents’ output levels. Entrants’ average production levels 
do not exhibit any clear trend either. In the final rounds, incumbents appear to produce a 
bit more and entrants a bit less than in equilibrium. Figure 7 shows average profits per 
type of player. The fact that incumbents’ average profits are negative in almost all post-
                                                          
10
 In rounds 11-20 firms appear to be colluding a bit more for the case of sequential entry than for 
simultaneous entry. 
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entry periods is surprising. The data in Table 4 show again under-performance of the 
market over all 40 rounds. As before, equilibrium consumer surplus is attained; the root 
of the considerable inefficiency is the allocation of production to the two types of firms. 
 Are things different when incumbents are sheltered from entry for a longer time? 
Figures 8 to 10 depict behavior in treatment Seq-Asym20. Comparing in Table 3 the 
evolution of quantity to that for the Seq-Asym10 treatment, the apparent differences are 
not very striking. For rounds 11 to 20 involving a triopoly, quantities appear to be a bit 
lower in treatment Seq-Asym 20, but the differences are really minor. Similarly, the 
comparison of average production levels (figures 9 vs. 4), profits (figures 10 vs. 5), and 
surplus levels (Table 4) do not reveal any relevant differences. To complete our first 
look at behavior in the different treatments, figures 11 and 12 pertaining to treatment 
Simul-Asym20 document that for the case of block entry, the length of the incumbency 
has no effect on behavior. 
 Figure 13 presents the ratios of total profits over equilibrium profits for the six 
treatments and the four blocks of rounds and figure 14 presents the analogous 
information for consumer surplus. Taken together, these two graphs tell a good part of 
the story of what goes on in our data. Consumer surplus’ evolution over time is very 
similar in the different treatments. It is below equilibrium before entry and then moves 
upward. In all but one treatment, total profits are a little above equilibrium in the 
incumbency phase. After entry they increase in the two treatments with symmetric firms 
but decrease and even become negative in the other four treatments. 
3.2 Statistical Analysis 
. We first study the overall performance of markets as reflected in consumer 
surplus and total profit levels and later move to analyzing incumbents’ behaviour.11 
Table 5 presents the results of OLS regressions that study the determinants of consumer 
surplus. The dependent variables are Csi, i=1, 2, 3, 4. The label Cs pertains to the ratio 
between actual and equilibrium surplus, and the number at the end refers to one of the 
10 round blocks, except for the last two treatments where block 1 actually had 20 
rounds.  
In the first four regressions the exogenous variables are (apart from the constant) 
dummy variables corresponding to the different (exogenous) treatments. “Short” refers 
                                                          
11
 Here and in all subsequent regressions the unit of analysis is the group. The number of observations is 
54 and *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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to an initial incumbency phase of ten rounds and “simul” and “seq” have the same 
meaning as in the treatment labels. The notion here is simply to see by comparison 
between the four regressions how the exogenous treatments affect behaviour over time. 
In the last regressions where the endogenous variables are Cs2, Cs3, and Cs4, we 
include Cs1 as an exogenous variable to check for any level effect of pre-entry 
behaviour. In these and all our other regressions below, we take each session as a 
separate data point. In this way our regression analysis is based on statistically 
independent information. 
 
TABLE 5. DETERMINANTS OF CONSUMER SURPLUS 
Dependent 
Variable 
Cs1 Cs2 Cs3 Cs4 Cs2 Cs3 Cs4 
Short .0543889 
(.0806118) 
-.1506111 
(.0623511)**  
-.0976667 
(.0436902)** 
-.0.333889 
(.0550598) 
-.1638033 
(.0600787)*** 
-.101013 
(.0440476)** 
-030654 
(.0557198) 
Simul .0513704 
(.0658192) 
.1057407 
(.0509095)** 
.0347037 
(.0356729) 
-.0574444 
(.0449562) 
.0932807 
(.0491289)* 
.0315431 
(.0360195) 
-.0548613 
(.0455644) 
Sym .0573889 
(.0806118) 
-.0129444 
(.0623511) 
-.2093889 
(.0436902)*** 
-.1194444 
(.0550598)** 
-.0268643 
(.0601095) 
-.2129198 
(.0440701)*** 
-.1165587 
(.0557483)** 
Cs1 - - - - .2425536 
(.1049227)** 
.0615261 
(.0769256) 
-.0502839 
(.0973102) 
Constant .5533148 
(.0658192)*** 
.9653519 
(.0509095)*** 
1.207648 
(.0356729)*** 
1.102444 
(.0449562)**
* 
.8311433 
(.0758618)*** 
1.173605 
(.0556192)*** 
1.130267 
(.0703577)*** 
Adjusted 
R2 
-.01 .16 .48 .12 .22 .48 .11 
 
 The table shows the value of the coefficient and the standard error in 
parentheses; negative coefficients indicate a worsening of the attained consumer surplus 
with respect to the equilibrium level. The first regression, with Cs1 as dependent 
variable, reveals that the collusion that is present in the first ten rounds is, as expected, 
independent of the treatment varaibles; the strongly significant constant shows that 
consumer surplus is somewhat above 55% of its equilibrium.  
The next three regressions reflect the impact of the treatment variables over 
time. The shorter incumbency phase has a significantly negative impact in after-entry 
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rounds 11-20 and 21-30, which weakens over time in its magnitude. For after-entry 
rounds 31-40, the coefficient is no longer significant. Perhaps surprisingly, a shorter 
incumbency phase leads to higher post-entry tacit collusion. 
The simultaneity of entry has a positive impact on the consumer surplus ration in 
the ten rounds just after the first entry takes place. What seems to matter is the number 
of firms in the market, which in the first ten after-entry rounds is five under 
smultaneous entry and only three under sequential entry. Once under sequential entry 
there are a total of four firms in the market, there is no difference between simultaneity 
and sequentiality of entry. 
 Symmetry has a significantly negative effect both in rounds 11-20 and 21-30 
after the first entry, but no significant effect before that. This reflects the tendency to 
some tacit collusion under symmetry, discussed in the previous section. In the last three 
regressions in Table 5 we control for the consumer surplus ratio in the incumbency 
phase. As can be seen the presence of  Cs1 as control does not affect any of the effect of 
the treatment variables; however, it does have a significant effect on Cs2, reflecting a 
carry-over of collusion from the incumbency phase into the first ten after-entry rounds. 
 
TABLE 6. DETERMINANTS OF TOTAL PROFITS 
Dependent 
Variable 
Ps1 Ps2 Ps3 Ps4 Ps2 Ps3 Ps4 
Short .0095 
(.0527346) 
.7348333 
(.1635447)*** 
.1731667 
(.1971105) 
-.0220778 
(.2910852) 
.7285792 
(.1614924)*** 
.1707191 
(.1987026) 
-.0089985 
(.2848396) 
Simu -.0044852 
(.0430576) 
-.347963 
(.1335337)** 
-.1365185 
(.1609401) 
.2856444 
(.2376701) 
-.3450102 
(.1318295)** 
-.135363 
(.1622049) 
.2794693 
(.2325203) 
Sym -.12945 
(.0527346)** 
-.082 
(.1635447) 
.8706667 
(.1971105)*** 
1.2068 
(.2910852)*** 
.0032209 
(.1708913) 
.9040175 
(.2102672)*** 
1.028577 
(.3014174)*** 
Ps1 - - - - .6583304 
(.4329425) 
.2576349 
(.5326988) 
-1.376772 
(.7636222)* 
Constant 1.067298 
(.0430576)*** 
.4503704 
(.1335337)*** 
.1463704 
(.1609401) 
-.0689333 
(.2376701) 
-.2522644 
(.4805122) 
-.1286029 
(.5912293) 
1.400493 
(.8475255) 
Adjusted 
R2 
.08 .35 .36 .28 .36 .35 .31 
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 Table 6 shows regression results corresponding to total profits (producer 
surplus). The variables Psi i=1 2, 3, 4 denote producer surplus as a ratio of equilibrium 
producer surplus for the four ten round blocks after entry. In the first regression, with 
Ps1 as dependent variable, the simultaneity of entry has a significant effect, for which 
we have no good explanation. Moving to the next three regressions, one can see that in 
the first ten after-entry rounds a shorter incumbency phase actually helps to keep profits 
up, in a way an anti-inertia result, but has no effect in the subsequent twenty rounds. 
This is consistent with the results for consumer surplus, reported above. The 
simultaneity dummy has a significantly negative effect for Ps2, but no significant effect 
on Ps3 and Ps4. It is as if the simultaneous entry had initially a shock-effect, to which 
firms later learn to adapt. 
The symmetry dummy has a significantly positive effect on Ps3 and Ps4. 
Comparing again figures 1 and 4 on one hand and 2 and 6 on the other hand helps 
interpret this finding. In the asymmetric cases incumbent firms frequently resist leaving 
the market, even if this implies negative profits. 
 The last three regressions in Table 6 reveal that the effects of the treatment 
variables are essentially not affected by the inclusion of Ps1 as exogenous variable, 
which does have a positive effect in the first ten rounds after entry.  
We now move to studying more formally incumbents’ output decisions. In Table 
7 we can see the impact of the treatment variables on the variables denoted by 
Msdi=((incumbents’ profits/total profits) – (incumbents’ equilibrium profits/total 
equilibrium profits)), i=1, 2, 3, where Msd is an acronym for market share difference. 
The subscript refers here to blocks of rounds after the incumbency phase since during 
this phase Msd is by definition zero. In equilibrium this variable is always equal to zero; 
positive values correspond to incumbents being able to hold on to market share after 
entry. The first three regressions’ exogenous variables are again the treatment variables, 
in the last three regressions we condition on Ps1, a measure of collusion in the 
incumbency phase. 
Here we can see that symmetry has a significantly negative impact on the Msd 
variable. Consistent with what we have seen above, in the asymmetric treatments the 
incumbents are able to maintain larger than equilibrium market shares to a statistically 
significant degree. The length of the incumbency phase also has a statistically 
significant impact, negative in the first ten post-entry rounds and positive in the second 
ten post-entry rounds. 
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TABLE 7. INCUMBENTS’ MARKET SHARE DEVIATIONS FROM 
EQUILIBRIUM 
Dependent 
Variable 
Msd1 Msd2 Msd3 Msd1 Msd2 Msd3 
Short -.6799444 
(.2599711)** 
-.0643889 
(.1095199) 
-.341 
(.2529475) 
-.6804922 
(.2626777)** 
-.0643049 
(.1106667) 
-.3429576 
(.2553625) 
Simul .2.425185 
(.2122655) 
.0293333 
(.0894226) 
-.1174444 
(.2065307) 
-.2422599 
(.21444292) 
-.0292937 
(.0903395) 
-.1165202 
(.2084576) 
Sym .3244444 
(.2599711) 
-.4128333 
(.1095199)*** 
.0391667 
(.2529475) 
.3319078 
(.2779657) 
-.4139782 
(.1171076)*** 
.0658412 
(.2702247) 
Ps1 - - - .0576542 
(.7042088) 
-.0088444 
(.2966847) 
.2060606 
(.6845974) 
Constant .4848148 
(.2122655)** 
.4242778 
(.0894226)*** 
.3557222 
(..2065307)* 
.4232806 
(.781584) 
.4337174 
(.3292831) 
.1357941 
(.7598179) 
Adjusted 
R2 
.09 .27 .01 .07 .25 -.02 
 
We can now formulate four regularities that answer the four research questions 
that we posed in section 2.1. In the concluding section we discuss their implications. 
Regularity 1: When firms are identical, consumer and total surplus reach 
equilibrium levels after enough entry. When incumbents are less efficient than entrants 
consumer surplus tends to equilibrium but total surplus remains considerably below 
equilibrium. These results are independent of whether entry is sequential or 
simultaneous and of the length of the incumbency phase. 
 
 Regularity 2: When firms are identical, incumbents are not able to hold on to a 
larger than equilibrium market share. When incumbents are less efficient than entrants, 
incumbents’ post-entry actual market shares are significantly larger than in 
equilibrium. 
 
 Regularity 3: Whether entry is simultaneous or sequential has no effect on 
consumer surplus, total surplus, and incumbent market shares. 
 
 Regularity 4: A shorter incumbency phase leads to lower consumer surplus and 
higher profits in rounds 21-30 after first entry. It has a significantly negative impact on 
incumbents’ market in rounds 11-20 and to a significantly positive impact in rounds 21-
30. 
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4. Concluding remarks 
We can now get back to the major themes that we presented in the introduction 
to the paper. The experiments we present in this paper are meant to be a contribution to 
the understanding of the market selection process. We find that in the different 
treatments with asymmetric firms, incumbents produce significantly more and entrants 
significantly less of what the relevant equilibrium prescribes. Consistent with this, profit 
levels in these markets are substantially below equilibrium.  
The replacement of inefficient firms by more efficient ones is, in our 
environment, not a clean process; it takes place with some turbulence. This is perhaps 
the main idea to take away from our work: market selection of more efficient firms 
works eventually, but during a certain transition phase some of the agents in the market 
will oppose market forces and, by doing so, distort market signals. This occurs in an 
environment in which incumbents do not have any strategic advantage in terms of an 
entry cost or any other factor. 
 It is interesting that in the symmetric markets of our treatments with symmetric 
firms, we do not observe significant incumbency advantages. This suggests that 
observed behavior in the asymmetric markets is not just the result of incumbents having 
“deep pockets” due to the accumulated earnings from the duopoly phase. There is 
something in the characteristics of the asymmetric equilibrium that is difficult for 
participants to gauge or accept. One possibility is that in the experiment incumbents 
resisted obtaining lower payments in the experimental currency. However, we used 
different conversion rates for participants with different entry points. Also, when entry 
occurs incumbents have had an incumbency phase behind them in which they have been 
able to accumulate earnings, so that from the point of view of relative payoffs 
incumbents should not necessarily feel they are behind.  
Perhaps incumbents’ behavior is driven by some sense of entitlement. Simon 
(1955, 1959) introduced the idea that decision makers satisfice (instead of optimizing) 
and that what they find satisfactory is a function of, among other things, past 
experience. From here the notion of aspiration levels emerged. In their study of the 
merger paradox Huck et al. (2007) study mergers and entry under quantity competition 
with firms with identical cost functions. They find that merged firms retain, after the 
merger, larger than equilibrium market shares. In their entry treatment one firm is added 
to a market with 3 incumbents who had interacted over 25 rounds. The result is that the 
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three entrants retain, after entry, larger market shares than the identical entrant. They 
show that their set of treatments is consistent with the notion of aspiration levels.  
Our results for the asymmetric treatments (incumbents’ resistance to entrants) 
are consistent with those of Huck et al. (2007), but our results in the symmetric 
treatments are not. The environment we study differs in several respects from theirs, so 
it is not easy to attribute the difference to one particular feature. One important 
difference pertains to the numbers of incumbents and entrants. In the entry treatment of 
Huck et al. (2007), one additional firm enters a market of three incumbent firms, 
whereas in our case there are two incumbents and three entrants. One possible 
explanation of the discrepancy of results is that behavior is influenced by the perception 
that the relative strength of incumbents and entrants depends on how many firms are in 
the two groups. In addition, in Huck et al. (2007) the incumbency phase lasted for 25 
rounds, and this can have solidified incumbents’ aspiration levels and their perception 
by entrants. A third important difference between the two designs is that, in our case, 
incumbents and entrants knew beforehand at what point in time each of the entrants 
would be given access to the market. In addition, entrants who had not yet been given 
access to the market received information about the total output produced. In our design 
the market is more transparent. In the symmetric treatments this may induce the entrants 
to be less cautious, and, anticipating this, the incumbents to adjust accordingly. 
 Another explanation of the difference in results is that the fact of having been in 
the market first gives incumben s some sense of superiority vis-à-vis the entrants. 
Camerer and Lovallo (1999) use experiments to study excess entry into markets and 
attribute it to overconfidence. In another experimental study Grieco et al. (200t) explain 
excess entry in terms of people seeking ambiguity when the source of uncertainty is 
related to their self-assessed competence, in the spirit of Heath and Tversky (1991). The 
question arises whether issues of overconfidence and self-assessed competence also 
play a role in our context. Perhaps symmetric entrants feel somehow more competent 
about making choices than asymmetric entrants. This could allow incumbents to hold on 
to a part of the market for a while, leading to the noisy adjustment process that we 
observe in some of our treatments. 
 It is worth reiterating here that the incumbency advantage that we observe does 
not hurt consumers. The fights for the market between incumbents and entrants lead to 
large output levels and low prices. However, production inefficiencies are considerable 
and lead to total surplus levels of about 80% of the equilibrium levels. 
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 The fact that incumbents often earn negative profits when they behave in such a 
way indicates that it will not be sustainable in the long-run. We conjecture that after 
enough time behavior will resemble rather closely the one corresponding to the Cournot 
equilibrium. Nevertheless, the behavior we observe does not appear to be a feature of 
only the very short run. 
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Table 3. Total Quantity  (actual vs. equilibrium) 
 TREATMENT 
Seq-Sym10 
TREATMENT 
Simul-Sym10 
TREATMENT 
Seq-Asym10 
TREATMENT 
Simul-Asym10 
TREATMENT 
Seq-Asym20 
TREATMENT 
Simul-Asym20 
Period Q(equ.) Q(actual
) 
Q (equ.) Q 
(actual) 
Q (Equ.) Q 
(Actual) 
Q (equ.) Q 
(actual) 
Q (equ.) Q 
(actual) 
Q (equ.) Q 
(actual) 
1 40 28.11 40 22,79 60 39.67 60 30.44 60 36.33 60 32.89 
2 40 30.78 40 24,55 60 45 60 31.33 60 36.56 60 34.44 
3 40 28.89 40 26,55 60 44.11 60 41.11 60 45.78 60 38.56 
4 40 28.78 40 29,33 60 43.78 60 45.11 60 45.67 60 44.44 
5 40 28.22 40 33 60 47.67 60 42.89 60 46.78 60 37.78 
6 40 29.44 40 35,33 60 44.56 60 46 60 47.11 60 40 
7 40 30.22 40 35,44 60 44.56 60 48.67 60 49.11 60 43.78 
8 40 30.78 40 38,22 60 45.56 60 51.89 60 48.11 60 45.33 
9 40 33.11 40 37,67 60 48.78 60 49.67 60 48.11 60 38 
10 40 34.22 40 36,33 60 46.11 60 47.78 60 46.89 60 42.44 
11 45 46.11 50 59,99 70 59.44 75 80.89 60 49.56 60 45 
12 45 35 50 44,77 70 56.67 75 77.56 60 51.11 60 49.78 
13 45 34 50 40,65 70 62.44 75 70.33 60 50.22 60 49.56 
14 45 37.67 50 43,45 70 65.56 75 72.11 60 50.56 60 50.44 
15 45 39.78 50 48,88 70 56 75 65.22 60 52.22 60 51.56 
16 45 36.11 50 43,45 70 63.44 75 73.67 60 49.67 60 48.44 
17 45 37.56 50 47,99 70 65.89 75 76.11 60 51.33 60 50.89 
18 45 38.67 50 44,33 70 61.22 75 73.67 60 51.11 60 52.67 
19 45 36.89 50 45,78 70 62.89 75 67.67 60 51.67 60 53.22 
20 45 38.67 50 50,78 70 64.11 75 68.56 60 52.67 60 49.11 
21 48 45.78 50 49,23 66 67.56 75 76.44 70 59.44 75 82 
22 48 40.22 50 47 66 61.78 75 72.89 70 57.22 75 54.67 
23 48 43.78 50 46,55 66 70.33 75 73.22 70 59.89 75 60.89 
24 48 43.33 50 48,21 66 78.11 75 73.44 70 64.22 75 73 
25 48 41.67 50 50,22 66 77.56 75 75.89 70 61.22 75 73.56 
26 48 46.44 50 51 66 63.56 75 76.22 70 64.78 75 73.22 
27 48 42.22 50 50,89 66 62 75 78.11 70 61.89 75 78.22 
28 48 47.78 50 44,43 66 68.11 75 73.78 70 62.22 75 74.44 
29 48 47.56 50 47,23 66 70 75 77 70 62.78 75 83.22 
30 48 44.22 50 47,21 66 73.78 75 77.89 70 66.67 75 71.89 
31 50 48.89 50 47,54 75 79.89 75 80.11 66 79.89 75 71.89 
32 50 48.78 50 47,21 75 70.11 75 77.11 66 67 75 74.67 
33 50 43.89 50 50,65 75 77.67 75 77 66 68.22 75 77.78 
34 50 44.78 50 47,45 75 75.22 75 73.11 66 71.11 75 76.89 
35 50 48.78 50 49,98 75 74.89 75 77.44 66 71.56 75 82.22 
36 50 51.67 50 43,9 75 83.89 75 81.78 66 71.89 75 73.78 
37 50 50.89 50 44,32 75 76.78 75 80 66 75.22 75 78.33 
38 50 44.67 50 44,95 75 77.11 75 79 66 67.67 75 78.89 
39 50 48.89 50 44,21 75 89.22 75 76.78 66 68.11 75 78.56 
40 50 45.78 50 45,74 75 87.67 75 74.78 66 70.11 75 78.78 
41         75 75.67 75 73.44 
42         75 66.33 75 79.67 
43         75 71.11 75 78 
44         75 69.56 75 79.22 
45         75 75.33 75 78.33 
46         75 69.78 75 84.22 
47         75 72.33 75 74.56 
48         75 70.56 75 74.56 
49         75 68.44 75 82 
50         75 73.56 75 76.89 
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Table 4. Total Surplus (actual vs. equilibrium) 
 
 TREATMENT 
Seq-Sym10 
TREATMENT 
Simul-Sym10 
TREATMENT 
Seq-Asym10 
TREATMENT 
Simul-Asym10 
TREATMENT 
Seq-Asym20 
TREATMENT 
Simul-Asym20 
Period TS 
(equ.) 
TS 
(actual) 
TS 
(equ.) 
TS 
(actual) 
TS 
(equ.) 
TS 
(actual) 
TS 
(equ.) 
TS 
(actual) 
TS 
(equ.) 
TS 
(actual) 
TS  
(equ.) 
TS 
(actual) 
1 290 213.01 290 191,54 300 211.24 300 202.07 300 186.05 300 170.97 
2 290 221.19 290 204,37 300 237.88 300 185.3 300 189.77 300 176.7 
3 290 212.47 290 218,15 300 237.74 300 230.76 300 233.28 300 202.49 
4 290 218.57 290 235,96 300 235.12 300 226.74 300 233.76 300 228.18 
5 290 218.44 290 257,1 300 250.99 300 216.73 300 243.83 300 201.89 
6 290 225.68 290 269,16 300 238.38 300 231.61 300 244.07 300 215.04 
7 290 226.44 290 269,70 300 237.56 300 243.57 300 252.61 300 231.24 
8 290 231.61 290 282,57 300 243.39 300 257.42 300 248.79 300 236.59 
9 290 243.67 290 280,12 300 257.57 300 251.35 300 247.67 300 199.82 
10 290 249.44 290 273,99 300 245.27 300 240.37 300 241.6 300 226.78 
11 292,5 265.72 275 285 325 280.75 378,75 396.23 300 252.94 300 238.49 
12 292,5 224.79 275 261,81 325 280.4 378,75 82.07 300 261.64 300 259.63 
13 292,5 242.44 275 247,57 325 295.85 378,75 281.51 300 257.81 300 259.71 
14 292,5 257.26 275 257,61 325 304.86 378,75 359.78 300 259.32 300 264.1 
15 292,5 262.36 275 272,62 325 278.14 378,75 269.58 300 266.23 300 268.13 
16 292,5 256.86 275 257,6 325 300.21 378,75 361.81 300 258.45 300 255.23 
17 292,5 259.67 275 270,57 325 301.18 378,75 324.16 300 265.59 300 267.04 
18 292,5 264.67 275 260,45 325 294.17 378,75 286.89 300 266.69 300 271.61 
19 292,5 259.53 275 264,78 325 296.51 378,75 328.47 300 269.43 300 274.21 
20 292,5 264.69 275 276,5 325 298.32 378,75 304.68 300 272.3 300 258.24 
21 285,6 264.51 275 273,39 383,1 291.09 378,75 262.8 325 273.78 378,75 287.91 
22 285,6 252.93 275 268,1 383,1 269.2 378,75 275.38 325 269.81 378,75 213.79 
23 285,6 270.64 275 266,91 383,1 303.73 378,75 339.86 325 276.95 378,75 251.16 
24 285,6 269.22 275 271,10 383,1 319.37 378,75 320.68 325 295.72 378,75 286.11 
25 285,6 262.57 275 275,44 383,1 316.11 378,75 272.77 325 288.18 378,75 285.37 
26 285,6 274.62 275 276,90 383,1 282.88 378,75 318.78 325 298.38 378,75 287.72 
27 285,6 266.58 275 276,69 383,1 277.89 378,75 360.87 325 293.28 378,75 289.72 
28 285,6 274.36 275 260,76 383,1 291.48 378,75 242.58 325 291.06 378,75 280.83 
29 285,6 279.69 275 268,70 383,1 299.12 378,75 269.69 325 295.87 378,75 285.09 
30 285,6 270.27 275 268,65 383,1 313.89 378,75 381.15 325 302.64 378,75 277.24 
31 275 272.29 275 269,48 378,75 293.25 378,75 430.63 383,1 304.61 378,75 291.12 
32 275 254.79 275 268,64 378,75 276.01 378,75 331.3 383,1 283.21 378,75 295.22 
33 275 261.54 275 276,27 378,75 277.73 378,75 294.56 383,1 287.79 378,75 305.58 
34 275 259.66 275 269,24 378,75 287.08 378,75 296.62 383,1 296.66 378,75 296.36 
35 275 269.83 275 274,96 378,75 288.91 378,75 304.23 383,1 302.16 378,75 299.43 
36 275 275.54 275 259,09 378,75 307.33 378,75 272.56 383,1 302.04 378,75 274.56 
37 275 269.09 275 260,41 378,75 286.15 378,75 315.47 383,1 300.27 378,75 286.01 
38 275 253.13 275 262,36 378,75 299.01 378,75 180.33 383,1 290.62 378,75 299.47 
39 275 265.67 275 260,07 378,75 315.03 378,75 330.19 383,1 292.78 378,75 305.26 
40 275 255 275 264,65 378,75 301.68 378,75 342.76 383,1 302.35 378,75 302.28 
41         378,75 280.78 378,75 293.92 
42         378,75 265.75 378,75 304.82 
43         378,75 268.09 378,75 305.21 
44         378,75 276.04 378,75 312.56 
45         378,75 291.9 378,75 308.35 
46         378,75 270.54 378,75 312.96 
47         378,75 281.56 378,75 298.40 
48         378,75 278.44 378,75 304.81 
49         378,75 266.84 378,75 307.28 
50         378,75 288.38 378,75 294.2 
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Figure 1: Average q across firm types for Treatment Seq-Sym10
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Figure 2: Average q (incumbents vs. entrants) for Treatment Simul-Sym10
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Figure 3: Average q across firm groups for Treatment Seq-Asym10
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Figure 4: Average q (inefficient vs. efficient) and (actual vs. equ.) for Treatment Seq-Asym10
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Figure 5: Average profit (inefficient vs efficient) for Treatment Seq-Asym10
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Figure 6: Average q (inefficient vs. efficient) and (actual vs equ) for Treatment Simul-Asym10
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Figure 7: Average Profit (inefficient vs efficient) for Treatment Simul-Asym10
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Figure 8: Average q across firm groups for Treatment Seq-Asym20
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Figure 9: Average q(inefficient vs. efficient) and (actual vs. equ.) for Treatment Seq-Asym20
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Figure 10: Average profits (inefficient vs. efficient) for Treatment Seq-Asym20
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Figure 11: Average q (inefficient vs efficient) and (actual vs equ.) for Treatment Simul-Asym20
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Figure 12: Average Profit (inefficient vs efficient) and (actual vs equ) for Treatment Simul-
Asym20
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Figure 13: TP(actual)/ TP(equ) ratio across treatments
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Figure 14: CS(actual) / CS(equ) ratio across treatments
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APPENDIX: INSTRUCTIONS FOR TREATMENT 2.1a 
General Information.  
We thank you for coming to the experiment. The purpose of this session is to study how people 
make decisions in a particular situation. During the session it will not be permitted to talk or communicate 
with the other participants. If you have a question, please raise your hand and one of us will come to your 
table to answer it. During the session you will earn money. During the session the income will be 
denominated in points. At the end of the session the points will be converted into euros in a way that is 
explained below. 
 At the end of the session the amount you have earned will be paid to you in cash. Payments are 
confidential, we will not inform any of the other participants of the amount that you earn. 
 
Groups and types in groups. 
 
 During the experiment you will be in a group of five, you and another four participants. Each 
group will be composed by the same five persons during the whole experiment. The members of each 
group will be of different types: A, B, C, D and E. Types A and B will be in one situation, type C will be 
in a different situation, type D in a different situation, and type E in again a different situation. The 
composition of the groups and the types within the groups will be determined randomly. 
 
Periods. 
 
 The session consists of 40 periods. In periods 1 to 10 the types A and B of each group will make 
decisions and the types C, D and E will not make decisions. After each of the periods 1 to 10 all the types 
in one group will receive information about the decisions made by the A and B in the group. 
 In periods 11 to 20 types A, B and C of each group will make decisions and types D and E will 
not make decisions. After each of the periods 11 to 20 all the types in one group will receive information 
about the decisions made by the A, B and C in the group. 
In periods 21 to 30 types A, B, C and D of each group will make decisions and type E will not 
make decisions. After each of the periods 21 to 30 all the types in one group will receive information 
about the decisions made by the A, B, C and D in the group. 
In periods 31 to 40 types A, B, C, D and E of each group all will make decisions. After each of 
the periods 31 to 40 all the types in one group will receive information about the decisions made by the A, 
B, C, D and E in the group. Period 40 will be the last of the session. 
 
 
Decisions and periods 
Periods Types that make decisions Types that don’t make 
decisions 
1-10 A y B C, D y E 
11-20 A, B y C D y E 
21-30 A, B, C y D E 
31-40 A, B, C, D y E - 
 
 
Decisions and earnings. 
 
 When somebody has the possibility of making a decision, this decision will consist in which 
quantity to produce to sell in a market. Any integer quantity between 0 and 30 can be chosen.  
 In periods 1 to 10, types A and B of each group will have to decide individually which quantity 
to produce. Participants C, D and E will not make decisions and their earnings in these periods will be 
zero. 
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 The earnings of each period for A and B will depend on their decisions. If type A or B produces 
zero in a period his earnings in that period will be zero. If he produces a positive quantity then the 
earnings will be 
 
Earnings = (Price –MC)*quantity produced by the participant – F, 
 
MC = 2. This is called “marginal cost” and is paid for each produced unit. 
 
F=30. This is called “fixed cost”. It is a fixed quantity which will be subtracted any time that the quantity 
produced by the participant is positive.  
 
TOTAL 
QUANTITY 
PRODUCED 
PRICE  TOTAL 
QUANTITY 
PRODUCED 
PRICE  TOTAL 
QUANTITY 
PRODUCED 
PRICE 
        
1 10.9  41 6.9  81 2.9 
2 10.8  42 6.8  82 2.8 
3 10.7  43 6.7  83 2.7 
4 10.6  44 6.6  84 2.6 
5 10.5  45 6.5  85 2.5 
6 10.4  46 6.4  86 2.4 
7 10.3  47 6.3  87 2.3 
8 10.2  48 6.2  88 2.2 
9 10.1  49 6.1  89 2.1 
10 10  50 6  90 2 
11 9.9  51 5.9  91 1.9 
12 9.8  52 5.8  92 1.8 
13 9.7  53 5.7  93 1.7 
14 9.6  54 5.6  94 1.6 
15 9.5  55 5.5  95 1.5 
16 9.4  56 5.4  96 1.4 
17 9.3  57 5.3  97 1.3 
18 9.2  58 5.2  98 1.2 
19 9.1  59 5.1  99 1.1 
20 9  60 5  100 1 
21 8.9  61 4.9  101 0.9 
22 8.8  62 4.8  102 0.8 
23 8.7  63 4.7  103 0.7 
24 8.6  64 4.6  104 0.6 
25 8.5  65 4.5  105 0.5 
26 8.4  66 4.4  106 0.4 
27 8.3  67 4.3  107 0.3 
28 8.2  68 4.2  108 0.2 
29 8.1  69 4.1  109 0.1 
30 8  70 4  110 0 
31 7.9  71 3.9  111 -0.1 
32 7.8  72 3.8  112 -0.2 
33 7.7  73 3.7  113 -0.3 
34 7.6  74 3.6  114 -0.4 
35 7.5  75 3.5  115 -0.5 
36 7.4  76 3.4  116 -0.6 
37 7.3  77 3.3  117 -0.7 
38 7.2  78 3.2  118 -0.8 
39 7.1  79 3.1  119 -0.9 
40 7  80 3  120 -1 
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The price depends on the sum of the quantities produced by types A and B. To see what prices 
correspond to the different sums of quantities see the table on the next page. Observe that the larger the 
sum of quantities produced by A and B the lower the price. If the resulting price is very low or negative 
the earnings from the period can be negative 
In periods 11 to 20, types A, B and C of each group will have to decide individually which 
quantity to produce. Participants D and E will not make decisions and their earnings in these periods will 
be zero. 
 The earnings of each period for A, B and C will depend on their decisions. If type A, B or C 
produces zero in a period his earnings in that period will be zero. If he produces a positive quantity then 
the earnings will be: 
 
Earnings = (Price –MC)*quantity produced by the participant – F, 
 
MC = 2. This is called “marginal cost” and is paid for each produced unit. 
 
with MC = 2 and F=30 as before for types A and B, and MC=1 and F=30 for type C. 
 
 The price now depends on the sum of the quantities produced by types A, B and C, following the 
same table as before. If the resulting price is very low or negative the earnings from the period can be 
negative.  
In periods 21 to 30, types A, B, C and D of each group will have to decide individually which 
quantity to produce. Participant E will not make decisions and his earnings in these periods will be zero. 
The earnings of each period for A, B, C and D will be determined by the same expression as before, with 
MC=1 and F=30 for type D.  
 The price now depends on the sum of the quantities produced by types A, B, C and D following 
the same table as before. If the resulting price is very low or negative the earnings from the period can be 
negative.  
In periods 31 to 40, types A, B, C, D and E of each group will have to decide individually which 
quantity to produce. The earnings of each period for A, B, C, D and E will be determined by the same 
expression as before, with MC=1 and F=30 for type E.  
 The price now depends on the sum of the quantities produced by types A, B, C, D and E 
following the same table as before. If the resulting price is very low or negative the earnings from the 
period can be negative.  
 
Information after each period. 
 
 After each period you will all be informed of the total quantity produced by the group, of your 
own production and (in case it applies) of your earnings in points. You will also be informed of your 
accumulated earnings. 
 
Types and identification numbers 
 
 On your screen you will see your identication number. 
The participants with identification numbers 1, 6, and 11 will be the types A of each of the groups. 
The participants with identification numbers 2, 7, and 12 will be the types B of each of the groups. 
The participants with identification numbers 3, 8, and 13 will be the types C of each of the groups. 
The participants with identification numbers 4, 9, and 14 will be the types D of each of the groups. 
The participants with identification numbers 5, 10, and 15 will be the types E of each of the groups. 
 
Total earnings. 
 At the beginning of the session each participant will receive and additional endowment of 330 
points. After each period the earnings of the period will be added to (or subtracted from) the initial 
endowment to determine the current earnings in points.  
 At the end of the session the earnings in points will be transformed into euros. The exchange rate 
will be different for each type. 
 For types A and B each point will be exchanged for 0,021 euros. 
For type C each point will be exchanged for 0,019 euros. 
For type D each point will be exchanged for 0,029 euros. 
For type E each point will be exchanged for 0,075. euros. 
